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Tree Formation with Physical Layer Security
Considerations in Wireless Multi-Hop Networks
Walid Saad, Xiangyun Zhou, Behrouz Maham, Tamer Bas¸ar, and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract—Physical layer security has emerged as a promising
technique that complements existing cryptographic approaches
and enables to secure wireless transmissions against eavesdrop-
ping. In this paper, the impact of optimizing physical layer
security metrics on the architecture and interactions of the
nodes in next-generation multi-hop wireless networks is studied.
In particular, a game-theoretic framework is proposed using
which a number of nodes interact and choose their optimal and
secure communication paths in the uplink of a wireless multi-
hop network, in the presence of eavesdroppers. To this end, a
tree formation game is formulated in which the players are the
wireless nodes that seek to form a network graph among one
another while optimizing their multi-hop secrecy rate or the path
qualification probability, depending on their knowledge of the
eavesdroppers’ channels. To solve this game, a distributed tree
formation algorithm is proposed and is shown to converge to a
stable Nash network. Simulation results show that the proposed
approach yields significant performance gains in terms of both
the average bottleneck secrecy rate per node and the average
path qualification probability per node, relative to classical best-
channel algorithms and the single-hop star network. The results
also assess the properties and characteristics of the resulting
Nash networks.
Index Terms—
I. INTRODUCTION
THE ongoing advances in wireless technologies (e.g.,cognitive radio, device-to-device communications, etc.)
have introduced new security challenges in next-generation
networks. Despite the proven efficiency of classical crypto-
graphic techniques, the associated overhead and complexity
may make it hard to implement encryption algorithms in future
large-scale, heterogeneous, and distributed wireless networks.
To overcome this problem, recently, significant research has
been dedicated to studying the ability of the wireless physical
layer (PHY) for providing secure communications [1–14]. The
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main idea is to develop an information-theoretic construct that
exploits the wireless channel’s PHY characteristics, such as
fading or noise, traditionally seen as impediments, for improv-
ing the reliability of wireless transmission with little compu-
tational overhead. The pioneering work of Wyner showed that
perfect secrecy is achievable from an information-theoretic
viewpoint [1]. This has motivated many recent studies on
physical layer security in fading channels [2–14]. The main
design criterion for PHY security is the concept of a secrecy
rate [3], defined as the rate of secret information that can be
transmitted between two nodes, without being tapped by an
eavesdropper.
Toward deploying PHY security solutions in next-
generation networks, one important design challenge is to
better understand how the incorporation of PHY security
notions, such as secrecy rate, affects and impacts the network’s
operation and architecture. In particular, many future wire-
less systems, such as the IEEE WiMAX 802.16 [15], next-
generation LTE-Advanced systems [16–18], or cognitive ad
hoc networks [19–21], involve communications over hierar-
chical architectures, such as a multi-hop tree for uplink trans-
mission [16–18], [22–28]. The interplay between the need for
ensuring secrecy and the formation of such a tree architecture
is an important problem that has been relatively unexplored
in the literature. In fact, most existing studies focused on
the secrecy of either single-hop or two-hop (cooperative)
transmissions [2–6], [10]. Although a few exceptions are found
in the study of asymptotic behavior such as capacity scaling
laws [11], [12] and percolation [13], [14] in ad hoc networks,
however, little has been done to understand how the formation
of a multi-hop wireless network is impacted by the need for
jointly optimizing physical layer security.
The main contribution of this paper is to study the impact of
optimizing physical layer security measures on the multi-hop
communication tree architecture governing the uplink of next-
generation wireless networks. For this purpose, we formulate
a tree formation game among a number of legitimate wireless
nodes that seek to transmit data to a common base station, in
the presence of eavesdroppers. In this game, each node must
decide on its preferred path to the base station by optimizing a
utility that reflects the security of the chosen path. We consider
two scenarios with different assumptions on the knowledge of
the eavesdroppers’ channels available to the legitimate nodes
and derive a utility for path optimization in each scenario: The
utility is given as the bottleneck secrecy rate of the chosen
path when the full channel knowledge of the eavesdroppers is
available, while it is given as the path qualification probability,
i.e., the probability of achieving a certain target rate over
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the entire multi-hop path, when only the statistical channel
knowledge is known. To solve the tree formation game,
we propose a distributed algorithm that allows the nodes to
interact and decide on their multi-hop communication paths.
We show that the proposed algorithm converges to a stable
Nash network. Using simulations, we show that the proposed
tree formation game yields significant performance gains, in
terms of both the average bottleneck secrecy rate per node and
the average path qualification probability per node, relative
to classical best-channel algorithms and the single-hop star
network.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the system model and Section III presents the game
formulation. Section IV discusses the proposed utility metrics
while Section V presents the proposed tree formation algo-
rithm. Simulation results are analyzed in Section VI. Finally
conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
Consider a wireless network composed of N nodes that
need to transmit data to a common base station (BS) in the
uplink. Let N denote the set of all such nodes. In this network,
K eavesdroppers are present and able to tap into the transmis-
sion of the nodes, individually (i.e., no cooperation). We let K
denote the set of all eavesdroppers. The channel between any
two nodes experiences both path loss attenuation and small-
scale fading. We assume quasi-static Rayleigh fading channels.
For a transmission from node i ∈ N to (a different) node
j ∈ N ∪ K, the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is given
by
γi,j =
Pi · d−μi,j · |hi,j |2
σ2
, (1)
where Pi is the transmit power of node i, σ2 the variance of
the Gaussian receiver noise, di,j is the distance between node
i and node j, μ denotes the path loss exponent, and |hi,j |2 is
the fading gain which follows an exponential distribution with
unit mean. The average SNR is hence given by
γ¯i,j =
Pi · d−μi,j
σ2
. (2)
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that
all the channel fading gains are independent of one another
and the nodes have the same transmit power given as Pi =
P˜ , ∀i ∈ N .
To transmit their packets, the nodes can either use a direct
link to the BS or adopt multi-hop transmission. In this respect,
we assume that the nodes are willing to relay each other’s
packets and that they can use orthogonal transmissions during
multi-hop similar to [16–18], [22], [29], [30]. Consequently,
the final topology governing the network is a hierarchical
uplink tree structure1 whereby each node i ∈ N is connected
to the BS either directly or through one or more nodes in N .
Such a multi-hop communication network is envisioned to be a
strong candidate for deployment in emerging wireless systems
1While the scope of this paper is limited to tree networks, the proposed ap-
proach can be extended to other network architectures with some modification
in the game-theoretic formulation.
such as LTE-Advanced [16–18], [31], WiMAX 802.16j [15],
[32], [33], or IEEE 802.11s [34].
B. Secure Transmission Scheme
Hereinafter, we consider that the identity of the nodes (i.e.,
malicious or honest) is common knowledge in the network.
This assumption is similar to ones in most existing physical
layer security literature [2–14] and could model a variety of
practical scenarios. On the one hand, this model can capture a
scenario in which the nodes suspect the presence of malicious
eavesdroppers at specific pre-determined network locations
(e.g., in a battlefield or military scenario for example). On the
other hand, the studied model is also applicable to a network
in which the eavesdroppers are not malicious nodes, but rather
are legitimate participants in the network. In such a case, the
proposed model applies to situations in which some messages
are not intended for all nodes of the network such as when
some content is “premium” content and should be received
only by those who have paid for it (legitimate receivers) while
others (eavesdroppers) should be denied access (e.g., as in
[9]. This is also applicable to cognitive networks in which the
primary users might have some messages that they wish to
secure against known secondary users [23].
In the presence of the eavesdroppers, the legitimate nodes
will attempt to choose a secure multi-hop path to the base
station. Wyner’s celebrated wire-tap channel model [1] is
adopted to characterize the secrecy of message transmissions
from an information-theoretic viewpoint. In the wire-tap chan-
nel model, the message signal is received by a legitimate
receiver and an eavesdropper via two separate channels. The
objective of the transmitter is to find an encoding scheme that
simultaneously achieves reliability at the legitimate receiver
and secrecy against the eavesdropper. Reliability requires the
received signal at the legitimate receiver to be decoded with
arbitrarily small probability of error. Moreover, secrecy is
measured by the mutual information between the transmitted
message and the received signal at the eavesdropper. Perfect
secrecy is achieved if this mutual information goes to zero
rate-wise and it implies that the transmitted message is in-
dependent of the received signal at the eavesdropper. With
perfect secrecy, the eavesdropper cannot do any better than a
guessing-based exhaustive search for data detection and its bit
error rate (BER) stays at 0.5.
We consider that Wyner’s encoding scheme is used at each
node [1], i.e., the transmitting node chooses two rate parame-
ters, namely, the rate of transmitted codewords R′ and the rate
of the actual messages R. A positive rate redundancy R′−R >
0 is needed to provide secrecy against the eavesdropper. A
Wyner code of length M is constructed by generating 2MR′
codewords xM (w, v) of length N , where w = 1, 2, ..., 2MR
and v = 1, 2, ..., 2M(R′−R). For each message index w, we
randomly select v from {1, 2, ..., 2M(R′−R)} with uniform
probability and transmit the codeword xM (w, v). Clearly, the
rate redundancy R′−R determines the number of codewords
associated with each message. When the rate redundancy is
larger than the channel capacities of all the non-cooperating
eavesdroppers, perfect secrecy can be achieved. Additionally,
the legitimate receiving node can decode the transmitted
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Fig. 1. An illustrative of the studied model for multi-hop transmission with
physical layer security considerations.
message with negligibly small error if the codeword rate
R′ is below the channel capacity of the legitimate link.
Hence, a secure and reliable transmission over each single-
hop link requires a careful design of the two rate parameters.
A detailed description of the wire-tap channel model and
Wyner’s encoding scheme can be found in [1], [35], and [36].
In Section IV, we will describe the specific choices of the rate
parameters in two different scenarios.
Given these physical layer security considerations, the main
objective of the nodes is to interact in order to select their next
hops, i.e., form a graph G that interconnects them while taking
into account the presence of the eavesdroppers. An illustration
of the proposed model is shown in Fig. 1.
We note that the proposed scenario is relevant for studying
how physical layer security can be deployed in many scenarios
in the uplink of practical wireless systems such as LTE and
802.16j in which tree-based communication is expected to be
a central theme [16–18], [22–28], [34] (e.g., via relay stations
or via the use of device-to-device (D2D) communications).
Other networks in which tree multi-hop communication is
also relevant include ad hoc network and cognitive radio
networks [23]. Certainly, this work presents only a first step
toward better understanding how physical layer security can
be incorporated in realistic networks.
III. TREE FORMATION GAME: FORMULATION
To form a multi-hop network, the nodes need to interact
with one another. Moreover, each node is selfish, in the sense
that it needs to optimize its own utility. Hence, there is a
need to model these interactions in order to get an insight
on the multi-hop network architectures that will emerge from
them. To do so, we will use the framework of network for-
mation games. Network formation games are game-theoretic
techniques that are rooted in social networks and used to study
friendship relationships between individuals which are often
modeled as graphs [37]. In these games, several independent
decision makers (players) interact for the purpose of forming
a network graph G = (V , E) among each other, with V the
set of nodes or vertices in the graph and E the set of directed
edges or arrows. The objective of network formation is to find
some desired set of directed edges E among all the possible
configurations given the objectives of the involved entities.
Due to the striking similarity between forming friendship
relationships and forming the proposed multi-hop network
structure, network formation games are suitable for analyzing
our model.
To this end, the proposed multi-hop tree formation in the
presence of the eavesdroppers is formulated as a tree formation
game in which the players are the nodes. The interactions
between the nodes will result in a directed graph G(V , E)
with V = {1, . . . , N + 1} denoting the set of all vertices (all
N nodes in N and the BS) and E denoting the set of all edges
(links) between pairs of nodes. Each node seeks to connect to
the BS through a certain chosen path defined as follows.
Definition 1: A path between any two nodes i and j in the
graph G is defined as a sequence of nodes l1, . . . , lM such that
l1 = i, lM = j and each directed link (lk, lk+1) ∈ G for each
k ∈ {1, . . . ,M−1}. We denote the set Ti as the set of all paths
from node i to the BS, and thus |Ti| represents the number of
paths from node i to the BS.
In the uplink of a wireless network, each node will have a
single path that connects it to the base station. Therefore, we
will deal only with multi-hop tree structures, and, hence for
any node i we have |Ti| = 1, ∀ i ∈ V . Hereinafter, we denote
by ti ∈ Ti the path between any node i and the BS.
The second component of the game is the set of strategies.
In the proposed game, the strategy space of any node i ∈ N is
the set of nodes in V to which i can connect in the uplink. We
note that, due to factors such as computational capabilities,
each node j ∈ N can only accept a limited number j of
connections from other nodes. Hence, the strategy space of a
node i will exclude any node j that has more than j links
already connected to it.
The strategy choice of any node i is to choose the link
that it wants to form from its strategy space. A node i
cannot choose to connect to another node j which is already
connected to it either directly or indirectly, i.e., a node
cannot choose to connect to its descendants in the tree
structure. Normally, for a current network graph G, let Ai =
{j ∈ V \ {i}| ∃ links (i0 = j, i1), (i1, i2), . . . , (ip, ip+1 = i),
s.t. (il, il+1) ∈ G, ∀l} be the set of nodes that are
descendants of node i, and Si = {(i, j)|j ∈ V \ ({i}
⋃Ai)}
be the set of links corresponding to the nodes (including
the BS) with whom i can form a link. In consequence, the
strategy of a node i is to select the link si ∈ Si that it wants
to form, i.e., choose the node that it will connect to. As we
restrict our analysis to tree networks, any link formation,
i.e., choice of a strategy si ∈ Si is, in practice, a replace
operation in which the node disconnects its previous link
(if any) and chooses the new link si. Every choice of si
uniquely determines the path ti used by node i to connect to
the BS. To complete the formulation of the game, next, we
define the utilities, i.e., the metrics for each node.
IV. TREE FORMATION GAME: UTILITY
As discussed in the previous section, the strategy of an
arbitrary node i in the network formation game is to select
a link from Si. Given a network graph G, for every strategy
choice si ∈ Si, a given node i will experience a different
performance measure or utility (with physical layer security
considerations). In the following, for our game, we provide
a definition for a node’s utility function in two different
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scenarios: in the first scenario, the nodes have full knowledge
of the channels to the eavesdroppers, i.e., full channel state
information (CSI); while in the second scenario, only the
statistics of the channels to the eavesdroppers are known
by the nodes. In both scenarios, the full knowledge of the
channel to the intended receiver is assumed to be known at
the corresponding transmitter.
A. Full Eavesdroppers’ CSI
Under full knowledge of the eavesdroppers’ CSI, the
rate choices of the Wyner’s encoding scheme can be made
to achieve perfect secrecy for every message transmission.
Specifically, the codeword rate R′ is chosen arbitrarily close
to the capacity of the legitimate link, whilst the rate difference
R′ − R is set arbitrarily close to the capacity of the best
eavesdropper link, i.e., the eavesdropper whose link from the
transmitter has the highest capacity. As a result, the message
transmission is both decodable at the legitimate receiver and
secure against the eavesdroppers. The achievable secrecy rate
with Gaussian signaling from node i to node j is hence given
by [10, Eq. (15)]:
Ci,j =
(
Cdi,j − max
1≤k≤K
Cei,k
)+
(3)
=
(
log2(1 + γi,j)− max
1≤k≤K
log2(1 + γi,k)
)+
,(4)
where Cdi,j is the Shannon capacity for the link from node i
to node j, Cei,k is the Shannon capacity of the link from node
i to the eavesdropper k ∈ K, and a+  max (a, 0).
When multi-hop transmission is considered, the secrecy
over a single hop is generally a necessary condition for the
secrecy over the entire path. This is due to the fact that the
eavesdroppers may be able to take advantage of the signal
receptions from multiple transmissions of the same message
along the path. Nevertheless, the authors in [12] showed that
the secrecy over each hop also guarantees the secrecy over the
entire path if independent randomization is used in the code at
each hop. In this work, we only focus on the scenarios where
the secrecy of each hop guarantees the secrecy of the entire
path. Hence, the secrecy rate performance of a chosen path (or
strategy) is limited by the minimum rate of all the intermediate
links, which we refer to as the bottleneck secrecy rate. In other
words, the bottleneck secrecy rate resulting from a chosen
strategy can be used as a performance indicator during tree
formation. Formally, given the network graph G, for any node
i ∈ N , the bottleneck secrecy rate experienced by this node
is
ui(G) = min
(j,l)∈ti
Cj,l (5)
= min (Ci,n, un(G)) , (6)
where ti is the path selected by node i, determined by its
chosen strategy si = (i, n) and Cj,l is the achievable secrecy
rate over the link (j, l) and is given by (4). We can see that the
utility of a node i depends on the utility, i.e., the bottleneck
secrecy rate, of the directly connected node n it selects, as
well as the quality of the first-hop link (i, n).
B. Statistical Eavesdropper’s CSI
When the eavesdropper’s instantaneous CSI is unknown
to the legitimate nodes, perfect secrecy cannot always be
guaranteed2. In this scenario, we adopt the concept of secrecy
graph so as to characterize whether a secure link exists for a
given set of realizations of the eavesdroppers’ channel fading
states [13], [39]: a directed link between two nodes exists
in the secrecy graph when a successful transmission with a
prescribed message rate R can be made with perfect secrecy
given the realizations of the eavesdroppers’ channel fading
states. Hence, the existence of a link in the secrecy graph
depends on the instantaneous qualities of the eavesdroppers’
channels. In addition, we say that a path is qualified if all
the intermediate links exist in the secrecy graph, i.e., all
the intermediate links support the prescribed rate R. Since
the knowledge of the legitimate receiver’s instantaneous CSI
is available at the transmitter, the rate of the transmitted
codewords R′ can still be chosen arbitrarily close to the
capacity of the receiver’s channel for each link. The secrecy
of transmission over each link depends on whether the rate
redundancy R′−R is larger than the channel capacities of all
the eavesdroppers.
Since the eavesdroppers’ channel fading states are random
and unknown to the nodes, we use a probabilistic measure on
the level of security. In particular, we define a utility function,
named the path qualification probability, as the probability
that the path from node i to the BS is qualified, i.e., the prob-
ability that the path exists in the secrecy graph, when selecting
the strategy si. Note that the random variables that determine
this probability are the eavesdropper’s channel fading gains
in all hops which are independent of each other. Therefore,
the existence of a secure transmission is independent among
different hops (or links).
The probability of having a secure single-hop transmission
from node i to node j with a prescribed rate R is given by
pi,j = P
(
Cdi,j −R > max
1≤k≤K
Cei,k
)
(7)
= P
(
(1 + γi,j)2
−R > 1 + γem
) (8)
= Fem
(
(1 + γi,j)2
−R − 1) , (9)
where γem = max1≤k≤K γi,k and Fem(·) denotes the cumu-
lative distribution function (CDF) of γem given by
Fem(x) = P(γem < x) (10)
= P(γi,1 < x, γi,2 < x, ..., γi,K < x) (11)
=
K∏
k=1
P(γi,k < x) (12)
=
{ ∏K
k=1
(
1− exp
(
− xγ¯i,k
))
, if x ≥ 0,
0, if x < 0,
(13)
which is obtained using the fact that γi,k, ∀k ∈ K are
independent and exponentially distributed with means γ¯i,k.
When the capacity of the legitimate receiver’s channel Cdi,j is
less than the prescribed message rate R, the second condition
2An exception can be found in [38] which requires the number of antennas
at the legitimate nodes to be larger than that at any eavesdropper, and hence,
is not applicable to the scenarios considered in this work.
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in (13) happens (i.e., x < 0), which makes pi,j = 0. Since
Cdi,j is known to node i, transmission is never allowed when
Cdi,j < R.
Having found pi,j , the path qualification probability for any
node i ∈ N can be computed as
vi(G) =
∏
(j,l)∈ti
pj,l (14)
= pi,n · vn(G), (15)
where ti is the path selected by node i, determined by its
chosen strategy si = (i, n), when graph G is in place.
Similarly to the case of full eavesdropper’s CSI, the utility of
the node i only depends on the utility of the directly connected
node n it selects, as well as the quality of the link (i, n).
Having defined the possible utilities, the next step is to
devise an algorithm that enables the nodes to form the desired
tree structure, given their individual objectives.
V. TREE FORMATION GAME: ALGORITHM
A. Proposed Algorithm
In the proposed tree formation game, the nodes need to
interact so as to agree on a graph that will govern their multi-
hop transmission network. To this end, each node has an
incentive to select a path in order to optimize its own utility
either in (6) or (15), depending on the CSI knowledge. First,
we remark that no node has an incentive to disconnect from
the network, i.e., each node needs to transmit its data using
either a multi-hop path or a direct transmission. As a result,
hereinafter, we deal solely with connected graphs.
Each strategy choice si by a node i can lead to a new
graph structure. Hence, we let Gsi,s−i , denote the graph
formed when a given node i chooses a strategy si ∈ Si
while all other nodes choose a vector of strategies s−i =
[s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN ]. To find a desired strategy, a node
aims to maximize its utility, given any observation it has on
the current graph and eavesdroppers’ states. In this respect, it
will prove useful to define the concept of a best response, as
follows:
Definition 2: For any node i ∈ N , a best response is a
strategy s∗i ∈ Si such that ui(Gs∗i ,s−i) ≥ ui(Gsi,s−i), ∀si ∈
Si (under statistical CSI knowledge, this inequality should be
verified for v(·)).
Therefore, the best response for any node i ∈ N is
a selected path that maximizes the node’s desired utility,
given fixed strategies from all other nodes. It is well known
that deriving optimal network formation algorithms is a very
challenging task, and there are no generic rules for this
formation in the literature [40]. However, some notable algo-
rithms have been studied in social and economic networks for
various game models with directed and undirected graphs [37],
[40–43]. Nevertheless, these algorithms are restricted to spe-
cific utilities which are mainly related to social networks and
inapplicable to a wireless network such as in this work. To this
end, we propose a novel tree formation algorithm, based on
best response and composed of three main stages: discovery,
tree formation, and multi-hop transmission.
In the first stage, each node observes it environment so as
to discover neighboring nodes and learn the current network
state. In this stage, the nodes can use well-known learning and
discovery techniques such as in [44], [45] so as to discover
their neighbors. For example, during the initial operation of
the network, in which all nodes are directly connected to the
BS, each node can detect the strength of other nodes’ uplink
signals (through techniques similar to those used in ad hoc
routing discovery [44]) and, thus, find partners for multi-hop
communications. For each node i ∈ N , the outcome of the
neighbor discovery phase is a listing of potential neighboring
partners as well as the current observed state of the network.
Following network discovery, the nodes will engage in the
second stage of the proposed algorithm, i.e., the tree formation
phase. In this phase, having discovered the network, each node
chooses its best response, given its current knowledge about
the network graph. The proposed approach is myopic, in the
sense that each node aims at optimizing its current utility,
without accounting for a far sighted future evolution of the
network3. Here, we assume that the nodes make their best
response decisions, sequentially, in an arbitrary order. This
order is generally determined by the actual operation of the
network (e.g., which node makes the first decision, etc.). To
find its best response, a node i will interact, using pairwise
negotiations over a control channel, with its neighboring
nodes. As seen in (6) and (15), a node needs only to obtain
the utility of a prospective parent node, so as to assess its
own performance and, hence, make a decision on its best
response. During these negotiations, the nodes can also acquire
the CSI from one another, hence helping them in evaluating
their utility. Alternatively, the CSI can also be conveyed from
the base station as in [23], [27], [28]. This pairwise interaction
process can occur with low complexity as the involved nodes
do not need to exchange a lot of control information. Hence,
the tree formation phase will consist of a number of iterations
in which, sequentially, each node chooses its best response.
The convergence of this phase of the algorithm is guaranteed
as follows:
Theorem 1: Given any initial network graph G0 and any
sequence of best response interactions, the proposed tree
formation algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a final
network graph GM , after M iterations.
Proof: Any iteration m of the proposed tree formation
process consists of a sequence of best response links chosen
by the nodes. Let Gm be the graph reached at the end of any
arbitrary iteration m. Hence, the process can be represented
by the following sequence:
G0 → G1 → G2 → · · · → Gm → · · · (16)
A move from a graph Gm to a graph Gm+1 in (16)
represents the choice of a best response by an arbitrary node i.
To this end, clearly, when a node i chooses its best response,
as per Definition 2, the utility of node i does not decrease. This
best response choice by a node i may impact three types of
nodes: (I)- nodes who are connected to node i either directly
or indirectly, (II)- nodes who are not connected to i, (III)-
nodes who are parents of node i. Following a best response
by node i, the utilities of any node j = i that is connected to
3Although the proposed approach can be extended for accommodating
far sighted approaches, in general, these approaches are more complex to
implement, notably in a wireless context [37].
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TABLE I
PROPOSED ALGORITHM FOR TREE FORMATION.
Initial Network State
Initially, the network is organized according to a certain graph G0
(e.g., a star network or others).
Proposed tree formation process based on three phases
Phase I - Network Discovery:
a) Each node detects neighboring uplink transmissions.
b) Each node uses the detected signals to discover and learn about
the presence of neighboring nodes using well-known discovery
and learning techniques such as in [44–46].
Phase II - Distributed Tree Formation:
repeat
In an arbitrary but sequential order, the nodes play an iterative
tree formation game.
a) In every iteration m, each node i ∈ N interacts with the
discovered nodes, over a control channel.
b) Each node i ∈ N identifies its best response s∗i ∈ Si.
c) Each node i ∈ N executes its best response by replacing
its current link with a new link s∗i so as to maximize its utility.
until convergence to a Nash network GM after M iterations.
Phase III - Multi-hop Transmission with Physical Layer Security
Considerations:
The nodes transmit their packets over the Nash network GM .
i are also guaranteed not to decrease, since, as clear through
(6) and (15), an improvement in the utility of a node on a
given path can only lead to an improvement in the utilities of
its children. Further, it is clear that nodes in categories (II)
and (III) are not affected by the best response choice of node
i. Therefore, every move from a graph Gm to a graph Gm+1
in (16) leads to an increase or does not lead to any decrease
in the total utility of the network, i.e., the sum of all utilities.
Based on this fact, and given that the number of tree
structures that interconnect a finite number of nodes is finite,
then, the sequence in (16) will eventually end after a finite
number of iterations M . Hence, the proposed tree formation
algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a final network GM ,
irrespective of the starting network or the order of the sequence
of best responses.
Following the convergence to the final network, the nodes
can actually engage in the final stage of the algorithm which
is the actual transmission phase. In this phase, the nodes
will transmit their packets, using multi-hop where applicable,
and, subsequently achieve the desired utility measures, with
regard to physical layer security. The proposed algorithm is
summarized in Table I.
Moreover, it is of interest to investigate the stability of the
network resulting from our proposed algorithm in Table I.
Here, it is useful to define the following concept [41]:
Definition 3: Any network graph G interconnecting a set
of nodes N is said to be a Nash network iff no node i ∈ N
is able to improve its utility by changing its current strategy
si ∈ Si.
Inherently, a Nash network is basically an extension of
the renowned concept of a Nash equilibrium, when applied
to network formation games. A Nash network is, in fact, a
network graph in which the links chosen by all nodes are a best
response, and, hence, no node has an incentive to unilaterally
change its link choice. A direct consequence of Theorem 1 is
that any network resulting from our proposed approach is a
stable network, that is:
Corollary 1: Any graph structure GM resulting from our
proposed algorithm in Table I is a stable Nash network.
Note that the proposed tree formation algorithm can be
used for the two different CSI scenarios. The only difference
between them is the utility function used by the nodes when
selecting their paths. In the case of full eavesdropper CSI
knowledge, the utility is defined as the bottleneck secrecy
rate, which is the achievable secrecy rate over all the inter-
mediate links over the selected path. In the case of statistical
eavesdropper CSI knowledge, the utility is defined as the path
qualification probability, which is the probability that all the
intermediate links can support a prescribed secrecy rate.
B. Distributed Implementation
In practice, the proposed algorithm can be implemented in a
distributed manner. Following neighbor discovery, the nodes
enter in a negotiations phase during which, the nodes can
communicate, in a pairwise manner, over a control channel
such as the temporary ad hoc channel or using device-to-
device links [16–18]. This can be done via the following steps:
1) A node sends a “request for information” packet to each
node in its list of neighbors (e.g., sequentially).
2) A node that receives a “request for information”, re-
sponds with an estimate of its current utility.
3) All nodes store the received information.
In order to identify a best response operation, the nodes
will use these pairwise interactions to acquire information on
their prospective utilities. In the case of full CSI knowledge to
the eavesdroppers, a node can easily estimate its utility using
(6) given its available CSI information. Alternatively, if the
nodes are only aware of statistical CSI to the eavesdroppers,
then the utility in (15) is used and it can be evaluated by
only knowing the average SNR values, i.e., the prospective
locations of malicious nodes. Having evaluated its prospective
utility, each node can identify its best response and signal, over
the control channel, its willingness to connect to its chosen
node. This is repeated until convergence to the Nash network.
With regards to complexity, the main complexity of the
proposed algorithm lies in identifying a best response link.
To do so, the nodes need to interact with one another.
For instance, given a present network graph G, for every
node, the computational complexity of finding its preferred
partner, i.e., choosing a best response, is easily seen to be
O(|N \ Ai|), where Ai is the set of nodes connected to i.
The worst case scenario is for the star topology in which
case |N \ Ai| = |N | = N . Another overhead of the tree
formation algorithm lies in the utility update process after
a new strategy is chosen by each node. Whenever a node
i changes its parent node, its utility changes and so do the
utilities of its descendants (i.e., all the nodes that are either
directly or indirectly connected to node i). Hence, node i needs
to inform its child nodes to update their utilities, and then the
child nodes inform the grandchildren, etc. In this way, the
finally converged network is a Nash network w.r.t. the actual
utilities of all the nodes. However, the network may choose
not to include the utility update process to reduce the overhead
and complexity. In this case, the proposed algorithm can still
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run as described in Table I and its convergence would still
be guaranteed as per Theorem 1, however, the nodes would
then use the currently perceived utility of their parent node
to make their decisions. In this case, the converged network
without the utility update process is still a Nash network w.r.t.
the (possibly outdated) utilities known at all the nodes.
Further, we note, the number of iterations till convergence
is upper bounded by the total number of spanning trees over
the set N . However, in practice this total number of required
iterations is reduced by various factors. On the one hand, in
a practical implementation, a wireless node does not need to
investigate every single node in the network so as to choose its
strategy. In fact, a node needs to only rely on local information
(e.g., on the nodes within its vicinity) so as to make its next-
hop decision. The nodes can explore such information, for
example, by monitoring neighboring transmissions or through
the control or pilot channels broadcast by the base station. This
implies that, in practice, the nodes will not have to visit every
single network graph, before convergence. On the other hand,
for large networks, the complexity can be further reduced by
splitting the large network into multiple areas and applying
the proposed algorithm only within each area. By doing so,
one can reduce the overall complexity.
The proposed algorithm can also adapt the network to
environmental changes such as slow mobility or the ar-
rival/departure of nodes. To do so, the nodes can, periodically
repeat the process proposed in Table I. In this respect, periodi-
cally, the nodes re-evaluate the existing network by performing
the discovery phase and by evaluating their utility. The interval
between two consecutive attempts to detect an environmental
change is chosen depending on the experienced dynamics of
the environment. Once an environmental change is detected,
e.g., due to a change in the perceived utility or the discovery
of a new node, a node can decide to re-engage in the discovery
and tree formation phase of the proposed algorithm. This will
eventually lead to a new round of tree formation which, as
proven in Theorem 1 will also converge to a new Nash network
(convergence is guaranteed irrespective of the starting network
and/or the nodes sequence). Hence, the proposed approach
allows to adapt the network structure to periodic and slow
environmental changes.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For our simulations, we consider a square area of 2.5 km
× 2.5 km with the BS at the center. In this area, the nodes
and eavesdroppers are randomly deployed. The transmit power
of each node is set to 20 mW, the noise variance is set to
−100 dBm, and the path loss exponent is set to μ = 3. Unless
stated otherwise, for the case with statistical eavesdropper CSI,
we set the prescribed rate to R = 0.2. We set the maximum
number of connections that can be accepted by a node i to
i = 4, ∀i ∈ N .
In Figure 2, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
approach for a network with K = 3 eavesdroppers as the
number of nodes N varies in the case of full CSI knowledge.
Figure 2 compares the average bottleneck secrecy rate per
node resulting from the proposed game, the star network,
and a best-channel algorithm in which each nodes chooses
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Fig. 2. Average bottleneck secrecy per node as the number of nodes N
increases for a network with K = 3 eavesdroppers (case of full CSI
knowledge).
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Fig. 3. Average bottleneck secrecy per node as the number of eavesdroppers
K increases for a network with N = 15 nodes (case of full CSI knowledge).
the next hop having the best channel. In Figure 2, we see
that, as N increases, the average bottleneck secrecy rate per
node increases for the proposed game and the best-channel
algorithm. This increase is due to the fact that, as more nodes
are deployed, the likelihood of finding a multi-hop route with
an improved secrecy increases. Figure 2 demonstrates that the
proposed game yields significant gains, increasing with the
network size N and reaching up to 127.8% and 187.1% at
N = 25 nodes, relative to the best channel algorithm and the
star network, respectively.
Figure 3 shows the average bottleneck secrecy rate achieved
per node for a network with N = 15 nodes as the number of
eavesdroppers K varies in the case of full eavesdropper CSI
knowledge. In Figure 3, we can see that as the number of
eavesdroppers K increases the average bottleneck secrecy rate
decreases for all three schemes. This decrease is due to the
fact that the deployment of additional eavesdroppers leads to
an increased security threat for all hops at the physical layer.
Figure 3 shows that, at all K , the proposed network formation
game achieves a significant performance gain, in terms of the
average bottleneck secrecy rate, reaching up to 85.9% and
120% (at K = 3 eavesdroppers) relative to the best channel
algorithm and the star network, respectively.
Figure 4 shows the average bottleneck secrecy rate achieved
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Fig. 4. Average bottleneck secrecy per node as the number of eavesdroppers
K and network size N vary (case of full CSI knowledge).
per node as both the numbers of nodes N and eavesdroppers
K vary. This figure shows that as the number of nodes
increases, the average bottleneck secrecy rate per nodes in-
creases at all K . This is a byproduct of the fact that for
larger networks, the nodes are more likely to find more secure
routes to send their data. Moreover, Figure 4 shows that, as
the number of eavesdroppers increases, the average bottleneck
secrecy decreases for all network sizes, due to the increasing
threat. Hence, although having larger networks yields better
cooperation possibilities, an increase in the number of eaves-
droppers would limit the prospective gains.
In Figure 5, we show a snapshot of the Nash networks
resulting from running the proposed game in two scenarios:
(a)- a scenario in which no eavesdroppers are present and the
nodes maximize their bottleneck throughput (dashed lines),
and (b)- a scenario in which K = 3 eavesdroppers are
deployed in the network of (a) and the nodes update their
transmission choices while taking into account their physical
layer security measures (solid lines). This figure is generated
for N = 10 randomly deployed nodes with random real-
izations for the Rayleigh fading channels. Figure 5 clearly
illustrates the impact of physical layer security considerations
on multi-hop wireless transmission. First, prior the deployment
of eavesdroppers, typically, each node chooses the path with
best channels. However, once the eavesdroppers enter the
network, the nodes would replace their links with new ones
so as to optimize their bottleneck secrecy rate. For example,
in the presence of Eavesdropper 1 and because of its prox-
imity to node 10, both Nodes 1 and 7 update their selected
communication path. For instance, Nodes 7 decides to connect
directly to the base station while Node 1 decides to connect
to Nodes 7 instead of Node 10 (although the channel between
Nodes 1 and 10 is better than the channel between Nodes 1
and 7). Node 10 avoids connecting directly to the base station
and chooses to connect to Node 1 instead. This is due to the
fact that the channel between Node 10 and Node 1 is better
than its direct channel to the base station which implies that,
in the presence of Eavesdropper 1, Node 10 prefers to use
the multi-hop transmission through Node 1 despite the longer
transmission path. Due to the presence Eavesdropper 2 and its
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Fig. 5. A snapshot of the network structure resulting from the proposed tree
formation game for a network having N = 10 nodes for the scenario with
K = 3 eavesdroppers (solid lines) and the scenario in which no eavesdroppers
are present (dashed lines).
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Fig. 6. Average path qualification probability per node as the number of nodes
increases (case of statistical CSI knowledge).
proximity to Node 2, Node 5 decides to break its link with
Node 2 and replaces it with a direct connection to the base
station. Nonetheless, some nodes such as Nodes 2, 3, and 6
do not modify their transmission choices before and after the
deployment of the eavesdroppers.
In Figure 6, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithm for the case in which only statistical CSI on the
eavesdroppers’ channels is available. Figure 6 shows the
average path qualification probability per node resulting from
the proposed approach, the best-channel scheme, and the
star network, for a network with K = 3 eavesdroppers
as the number of nodes N varies. In this figure, we can
see that as the number of nodes increases, the average path
qualification probability per node resulting from the proposed
game increases. This increase is due to the fact that, as more
nodes are deployed, the possibility of finding a route to the
base station which achieves the prescribed rate increases. In
contrast, the performance of the best-channel algorithm and
the star network is relatively constant as the network size
varies. Fig 6 shows that the proposed game has a significant
performance advantage at all network sizes, reaching up to
118.2% and 112% at N = 25 nodes, relative to the best-
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droppers (case of statistical CSI knowledge).
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channel algorithm and the star network, respectively.
Figure 7 shows the average path qualification probability
per node resulting from the proposed approach, the best-
channel scheme, and the star network, for a network with
N = 15 nodes, K = 3 eavesdroppers as the prescribed
target secrecy rate R varies. In Figure 7, we can see that,
as R increases, the average path qualification probability per
node decreases for all schemes. This result stems from the
fact that an increase in the prescribed message rate R implies
a more stringent secrecy requirement and, thus, a lower path
qualification probability. Figure 7 clearly shows that, at all
rates, the proposed game yields significant performance gains,
in terms of the average path qualification probability per
nodes, reaching up to 86.6% and 86.1% at N = 25 nodes,
relative to the best-channel algorithm and the star network,
respectively.
Figure 8 shows the average and the maximum number of
iterations needed till convergence of the proposed algorithm
to a Nash network as the number of nodes N increases for
a network with K = 3 eavesdroppers. In this figure, we
can see that, as the number of nodes N increase, the total
number of iterations required for the convergence to a Nash
network increases. This is due to the fact that, as N increases,
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Fig. 9. Average and average maximum number of hops in the Nash network
structures resulting from the proposed game as the network size varies with
K = 3 eavesdroppers(case of statistical CSI knowledge).
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mobile network (with K = 3 eavesdroppers for different number of nodes)
in which the nodes engage periodically in the proposed tree formation game.
the possibilities for performing multi-hop increase, and, thus,
more best response actions are needed prior to convergence.
Figure 8 shows that the average and the maximum number of
iterations vary, respectively, from 1.2 and 3 at N = 5 nodes
up to 2.8 and 7 at N = 25 nodes. This result implies that,
on the average, the speed of convergence of the proposed
game is reasonable even for relatively large networks. In
Figure 9, we show the average and the average maximum
number of hops that govern the network architecture resulting
from the proposed tree formation game for a network with
K = 3 eavesdroppers as the number of nodes N increases,
in the case of statistical CSI knowledge. Figure 9 shows
that, as the network size N increases, both the average and
the average maximum number of hops in the final Nash
network tree structure increase. The average and the average
maximum number of hops vary, respectively, from 1.9 and 2.5
at N = 5 nodes, up to 4.6 and 8 at N = 25 nodes. Figure 9
demonstrates that, as the network becomes larger, the nodes
have an incentive to use a multi-hop communication so as to
optimize their secrecy.
In Figure 10, we evaluate how the proposed tree formation
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game enables the nodes to adapt to periodic mobility, in the
case of statistical CSI knowledge. The chosen mobility model
is a random walk scheme in which the nodes move at a
constant speed in a random direction uniformly distributed
between 0 and 2π. For both figures, in order to emphasize
solely the impact of the changes of the nodes’ locations due
to mobility, we considered that the fading is constant over the
whole duration.
Figure 10 shows, over a period of 5 minutes, the average
total number of actions performed per node per minute for
different node speeds for two network sizes in a network with
K = 3 eavesdroppers. The nodes evaluate whether they need
to change their strategies or not every 30 seconds. In Figure 10,
we can see that, as the speed of the nodes increases, the
average number of actions increases for both N = 15 nodes
and N = 25 nodes. This implies that, as the environment
changes faster, the nodes are more apt to change their tree
formation strategies. Moreover, Figure 10 shows that for larger
networks, the slope of increase is steeper due to the availability
of more possible network paths. In fact, Figure 10 clearly
demonstrates that the network with N = 25 nodes leads to
an average number of actions per node that is larger than that
of the network with N = 15 nodes. Hence, clearly, as the
network becomes larger, the nodes are more prone to take
a decision to change their links as reflected by the average
number of actions. In this context, for N = 15 nodes, the
average total number of actions per node per minute varies
from around 0.5 at 9 km/h to around 3 at 85 km/h while for
N = 25 nodes, this variation is from 0.7 at 9 km/h to around
4.5 at 85 km/h.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the problem of multi-hop
communications in the presence of malicious eavesdroppers.
We have proposed a novel game-theoretic formulation that en-
ables a number of wireless nodes to interact and optimize the
security of their uplink transmission. In the proposed game, the
strategy of each node is to choose its preferred path to reach
the base station, while optimizing physical layer security-
related utilities. The type of adopted utility depends on the
knowledge that the nodes have on the eavesdroppers’ channels.
To solve the game, we have proposed a distributed algorithm
that enables the nodes to engage in pairwise negotiation so as
to decide on the graph structure that will interconnect them.
We have shown that the proposed algorithm converges to
a Nash network and we have studied the properties of the
resulting network. Simulation results have demonstrated that
the proposed approach leads to significant performance gains
in terms of both the average bottleneck secrecy rate per node
and the average path qualification probability per node, relative
to classical algorithms and the star network.
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